I'm not Air Force, just a former lawn dart, so I had to search the term "authority gradient." Seems like it's used more in reference to aviation than land ops (I used this page for ref https://skybrary.aero/articles/authority-gradients ). If you think of a pilot in a single seater, then command of that aircraft is unified in the pilot and control is exercised through, well, the controls in the cockpit. In a crew resource management model (as I understand it), there is still an AC commander with overall authority, but various functions are offloaded to crew members. In the same way that the brain handles routine tasks unconsciously and makes many decisions preconsciously, having a crew extends the ability of the commander to operate a complicated aircraft in a way that would be impossible on their own. The short decision-action cycles of flying demand that crew members have autonomy (or at least have a lot of say) in how problems are solved. So everyone gets a say, but the loadmaster can't unilaterally re-route the flight even if they are empowered to abort an air drop because the ramp is malfunctioning. The loadmaster has authority commensurate with their responsibility and a duty to "see something say something." Let me know if this is off the mark.
The land domain model of minimalist C2 is "mission command." BLUF: commanders assign missions to subordinates which specify desired effects or outcomes, but do not detail the manner in which these outcomes will be achieved.
In a mission command construct, it's up to whoever is leading the mission at the front to figure out how best to accomplish the aim within the constraints they've been given. If the situation changes so drastically that the mission as briefed is no longer valid, then the leader at front must continue to act within the scope of the higher commander's intent until they receive new orders. It is critical (and often overlooked) that commanders delegate the authorities necessary for mission accomplishment down to the leaders who are best positioned to use them i.e. decentralized C2. High degrees of centralization (steep gradient) also cause land forces to crash due to human error, albeit on a longer timescale than aircraft. Even so, some things are centralized so as to avoid misuse e.g. authority to demolish a key bridge will be held at no lower than division level, so that a panicky Lieutenant Bloggins doesn't sever a Main Supply Route because they heard potshots in the distance.
Your drone example is already happening on the ground in Ukraine. Even as low as company level, commanders issue detailed directions to troops while maintaing broad Situational Awareness through drone feeds. Examples of the rogue subordinate abound in the 1973 war e.g. Ariel Sharon (a div comd) started pushing forces across the Suez Canal before his lines of communication were even close to secure. The theatre comd was telling Sharon to wait because he was aware of all the pressures elsewhere, but Sharon acted within his (few) constraints to exploit a seam between two Egyptian armies.
My prediction is that we will develop a hicon/locon split: when your battle management network is up, comds can exercise a high degree of control to get the most out of their broad SA and limited resources. When the network is disrupted or degraded, we will have to revert to old school low-control mission tactics. Like a JTAC who knows ATAK inside and out, but keeps a compass handy because shit happens.
I think you're right that democratized situational awareness -> low gradient C2 is probably the ideal, but I expect it to be aspirational. The 5000 km screwdriver effect where ops centres micromanage tactical engagements from across the ocean is already happening. For Canada and the US, I think it would require a profound culture shift and rigorous retraining. That sort of thing tends to happen after you lose big and need to rebound, not during the fat and happy days of peacetime. A buddy of mine in the US Army recounted a story about a two-star looking at his God screen and demanding to know why a single truck hadn't moved in 72hrs. "Uh... Sir, that's a radio re-broadcast det."
ok, I love this. please, more posts like this! (intro-level defining military concepts.) clear definitions/explanations from credible sources are hard to find in civilian-world.
I'm glad you found this useful! The military loves definitions and the jargon can be impenetrable when you're not immersed in it (and sometimes even when you are).
I'm not Air Force, just a former lawn dart, so I had to search the term "authority gradient." Seems like it's used more in reference to aviation than land ops (I used this page for ref https://skybrary.aero/articles/authority-gradients ). If you think of a pilot in a single seater, then command of that aircraft is unified in the pilot and control is exercised through, well, the controls in the cockpit. In a crew resource management model (as I understand it), there is still an AC commander with overall authority, but various functions are offloaded to crew members. In the same way that the brain handles routine tasks unconsciously and makes many decisions preconsciously, having a crew extends the ability of the commander to operate a complicated aircraft in a way that would be impossible on their own. The short decision-action cycles of flying demand that crew members have autonomy (or at least have a lot of say) in how problems are solved. So everyone gets a say, but the loadmaster can't unilaterally re-route the flight even if they are empowered to abort an air drop because the ramp is malfunctioning. The loadmaster has authority commensurate with their responsibility and a duty to "see something say something." Let me know if this is off the mark.
The land domain model of minimalist C2 is "mission command." BLUF: commanders assign missions to subordinates which specify desired effects or outcomes, but do not detail the manner in which these outcomes will be achieved.
In a mission command construct, it's up to whoever is leading the mission at the front to figure out how best to accomplish the aim within the constraints they've been given. If the situation changes so drastically that the mission as briefed is no longer valid, then the leader at front must continue to act within the scope of the higher commander's intent until they receive new orders. It is critical (and often overlooked) that commanders delegate the authorities necessary for mission accomplishment down to the leaders who are best positioned to use them i.e. decentralized C2. High degrees of centralization (steep gradient) also cause land forces to crash due to human error, albeit on a longer timescale than aircraft. Even so, some things are centralized so as to avoid misuse e.g. authority to demolish a key bridge will be held at no lower than division level, so that a panicky Lieutenant Bloggins doesn't sever a Main Supply Route because they heard potshots in the distance.
Your drone example is already happening on the ground in Ukraine. Even as low as company level, commanders issue detailed directions to troops while maintaing broad Situational Awareness through drone feeds. Examples of the rogue subordinate abound in the 1973 war e.g. Ariel Sharon (a div comd) started pushing forces across the Suez Canal before his lines of communication were even close to secure. The theatre comd was telling Sharon to wait because he was aware of all the pressures elsewhere, but Sharon acted within his (few) constraints to exploit a seam between two Egyptian armies.
My prediction is that we will develop a hicon/locon split: when your battle management network is up, comds can exercise a high degree of control to get the most out of their broad SA and limited resources. When the network is disrupted or degraded, we will have to revert to old school low-control mission tactics. Like a JTAC who knows ATAK inside and out, but keeps a compass handy because shit happens.
I think you're right that democratized situational awareness -> low gradient C2 is probably the ideal, but I expect it to be aspirational. The 5000 km screwdriver effect where ops centres micromanage tactical engagements from across the ocean is already happening. For Canada and the US, I think it would require a profound culture shift and rigorous retraining. That sort of thing tends to happen after you lose big and need to rebound, not during the fat and happy days of peacetime. A buddy of mine in the US Army recounted a story about a two-star looking at his God screen and demanding to know why a single truck hadn't moved in 72hrs. "Uh... Sir, that's a radio re-broadcast det."
Have a look at John Boyd’s “Organic Design for Command and Control”:
https://thewhirlofreorientation.substack.com/p/appreciation-and-leadership
Follow on tasks, love it. Thanks!
https://fasttransients.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/organic_design5.pdf
ok, I love this. please, more posts like this! (intro-level defining military concepts.) clear definitions/explanations from credible sources are hard to find in civilian-world.
I'm glad you found this useful! The military loves definitions and the jargon can be impenetrable when you're not immersed in it (and sometimes even when you are).