Looking forward to you sharing more thoughts in the future; good stuff so far. I am here thanks to Bruce Gudmundsson giving you a shout out in TACTICAL NOTEBOOK. I actually own a full set of the original paper version of it from the mid 90s.
Two comments:
1) Are you familiar with Paul Fussell's use of the term "chickenshit" from his time as a rifle platoon leader in WW2? Tracks well with your previous post on "...Bullshit."
From Wikipedia: "According to Paul Fussell in his book Wartime, chickenshit in this sense has military roots: "Chickenshit refers to behavior that makes military life worse than it need be: petty harassment of the weak by the strong; open scrimmage for power and authority and prestige; sadism thinly disguised as necessary discipline; a constant 'paying off of old scores'; and insistence on the letter rather than the spirit of the ordinances ... Chickenshit is so called—instead of horse—or bull—or elephant shit—because it is small-minded and ignoble and takes the trivial seriously."
2) I am much less enamored by Jim Storr's work of late and find some of his conclusions disconnected from reality and shows a lack of experience at echelon. His first book, THE HUMAN FACE OF WAR, was quite good, but I found his most recent work, SOMETHING ROTTEN to be chock full of errors and woefully dated observations about the U.S. Army and the Bundeswehr (das Heer) in particular. I had intended to write a critique and send to him, but the errors and or poorly formed conclusions just kept accumulating.
Posts are slow-going, but there's one coming up soon that will touch on "chickenshit". We still say chickenshit in the CAF, for exactly what you described. Pedantry in briefings or assessments falls under the umbrella of "chickenshit points" for example. There is definitely overlap with bullshit, although some uses are each are exclusive of the other. Maybe there's a future post in that.
Regarding Jim Storr, The Human Face of War was a pivotal moment in my professional development. It was my first exposure to operational research and proper military science. I haven't read Something Rotten yet, but based on your comment I fear that maybe he's gone the way of Martin Van Creveld, always returning to the same hobby-horses on what Western armies are doing wrong. I found Battlegroup! to be useful, because the Canadian Army is trying to re-learn LCSO. I respect the German tactical tradition and culture of Auftragstaktik, but I am skeptical when professionals describe the German way of war in worshipful terms. We are, after all, having this conversation in English.
If you don't already have one, get a copy of FIRST CLASH by Macksey. A good Cold War-era (circa 1985) WW3 conventional scenario about your father's generation in the 4th CMBG taking on Ivan.
Late to the party. I hope you were able to read Something Rotten. Having experienced or observed many of the themes of the book, I disagree with Mr Coglianese's assessment (which is okay - we all see things differently) and I find the book useful as it is the only substantive piece of writing today that points to a problem we all know exists, but we have a problem breaking from as institutions fall back on "what they know" (which is "what is taught").
Tremendous, Maples! Like Coglianese, I followed Bruce Gudmundson's link to you and was exulatant reading your post! So I ask you, why are we like this? Why do our organizations lean toward more process and more paper? I used to think it was a simple "peace-time armies" versus "war-time armies" problem, but after twenty years of actual operations, we (the USMC in my case) seem worse than ever at constructing useful plans and orders. Storr may be old and bitter (my assumption), but his thesis is correct: We over-plan, we over-predict, and we take too much time doing it!
Thanks, I'm glad you enjoyed it! I have similar thoughts re. Storr. I doubt that the problem can be traced back to any one thing. Low tolerances for risk is a known factor. I believe another factor is the importation of for-profit management techniques from the private sector. "What gets measured gets done" and it's easier to measure system outputs in terms of staff products generated and briefings held than it is to measure the overall performance of the force. See Goodhart's Law: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodhart%27s_law
Goodhart! I will remember that. Thanks. A parallel quote I remember, used to criticize the ‘body count’ in Vietnam: “When that which is important is difficult to measure, we ascribe importance to that which is easy to measure.”
Looking forward to you sharing more thoughts in the future; good stuff so far. I am here thanks to Bruce Gudmundsson giving you a shout out in TACTICAL NOTEBOOK. I actually own a full set of the original paper version of it from the mid 90s.
Two comments:
1) Are you familiar with Paul Fussell's use of the term "chickenshit" from his time as a rifle platoon leader in WW2? Tracks well with your previous post on "...Bullshit."
From Wikipedia: "According to Paul Fussell in his book Wartime, chickenshit in this sense has military roots: "Chickenshit refers to behavior that makes military life worse than it need be: petty harassment of the weak by the strong; open scrimmage for power and authority and prestige; sadism thinly disguised as necessary discipline; a constant 'paying off of old scores'; and insistence on the letter rather than the spirit of the ordinances ... Chickenshit is so called—instead of horse—or bull—or elephant shit—because it is small-minded and ignoble and takes the trivial seriously."
2) I am much less enamored by Jim Storr's work of late and find some of his conclusions disconnected from reality and shows a lack of experience at echelon. His first book, THE HUMAN FACE OF WAR, was quite good, but I found his most recent work, SOMETHING ROTTEN to be chock full of errors and woefully dated observations about the U.S. Army and the Bundeswehr (das Heer) in particular. I had intended to write a critique and send to him, but the errors and or poorly formed conclusions just kept accumulating.
Posts are slow-going, but there's one coming up soon that will touch on "chickenshit". We still say chickenshit in the CAF, for exactly what you described. Pedantry in briefings or assessments falls under the umbrella of "chickenshit points" for example. There is definitely overlap with bullshit, although some uses are each are exclusive of the other. Maybe there's a future post in that.
Regarding Jim Storr, The Human Face of War was a pivotal moment in my professional development. It was my first exposure to operational research and proper military science. I haven't read Something Rotten yet, but based on your comment I fear that maybe he's gone the way of Martin Van Creveld, always returning to the same hobby-horses on what Western armies are doing wrong. I found Battlegroup! to be useful, because the Canadian Army is trying to re-learn LCSO. I respect the German tactical tradition and culture of Auftragstaktik, but I am skeptical when professionals describe the German way of war in worshipful terms. We are, after all, having this conversation in English.
If you don't already have one, get a copy of FIRST CLASH by Macksey. A good Cold War-era (circa 1985) WW3 conventional scenario about your father's generation in the 4th CMBG taking on Ivan.
Late to the party. I hope you were able to read Something Rotten. Having experienced or observed many of the themes of the book, I disagree with Mr Coglianese's assessment (which is okay - we all see things differently) and I find the book useful as it is the only substantive piece of writing today that points to a problem we all know exists, but we have a problem breaking from as institutions fall back on "what they know" (which is "what is taught").
Thanks for the perspective, the book list grow e'er longer.
It never shrinks....
Also happy to have another Canadian on Substack. There are dozens of us, dozens!
How do you know I'm Canadian? ;)
Tremendous, Maples! Like Coglianese, I followed Bruce Gudmundson's link to you and was exulatant reading your post! So I ask you, why are we like this? Why do our organizations lean toward more process and more paper? I used to think it was a simple "peace-time armies" versus "war-time armies" problem, but after twenty years of actual operations, we (the USMC in my case) seem worse than ever at constructing useful plans and orders. Storr may be old and bitter (my assumption), but his thesis is correct: We over-plan, we over-predict, and we take too much time doing it!
Thanks, I'm glad you enjoyed it! I have similar thoughts re. Storr. I doubt that the problem can be traced back to any one thing. Low tolerances for risk is a known factor. I believe another factor is the importation of for-profit management techniques from the private sector. "What gets measured gets done" and it's easier to measure system outputs in terms of staff products generated and briefings held than it is to measure the overall performance of the force. See Goodhart's Law: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodhart%27s_law
Goodhart! I will remember that. Thanks. A parallel quote I remember, used to criticize the ‘body count’ in Vietnam: “When that which is important is difficult to measure, we ascribe importance to that which is easy to measure.”