SNAFU
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The Canadian Armed Forces are fucked. By this term of art, I mean that the CAF:
are in dire circumstances; and
are being used for such aggressive political gratification that it’s practically perverse.
You don't have to take my word for it. The Minister of National Defence made the following remarks last week:
"because, the bottom line is the Canadian Armed Forces must grow. We’re short a lot of people. Almost 16,000 in our regular forces and reserves.
If that wasn’t bad enough, he added:
"more than half of our trucks, more than half of our ships and more than half of our planes are not available for service because they are in need of parts and repair. We’re going to have to do better."
Translation: we are fucked.
The MND’s remarks come eleven months after the CDAI published an open letter on the state of national security and defence:
"Years of restraint, cost cutting, downsizing and deferred investments, have meant that Canada’s defence capabilities have atrophied. Our military capabilities are outdated and woefully inadequate to protect our landmass and maritime approaches. We have also fallen short in meaningful contributions to burden sharing for the collective defence and security of our allies and partners."
Translation: we have been fucked for awhile.
More recently, the Vice Admiral Tophsee made waves on the RCN’s official YouTube channel by stating the obvious:
"Colleagues and Shipmates, the RCN is facing some very serious challenges right now that could mean we fail to meet our Force Posture and Readiness commitments in 2024 and beyond. La situation est grave mais nos problèmes ne sont pas uniques et je sais que l'aviation et l'armée sont confrontées a des défis similaires."1
Translation: we will be fucked for the foreseeable future.
This is a shameful Canadian tradition. We fuck the troops until we need them, but until we really need them "it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that." It has been this way since we sent students dressed like soldiers to fend off the Fenians in 1866. It has been this way since 1914 when Sam Hughes and his cronies ramrodded hasty mobilization efforts for a war everyone else had seen coming. To pain the picture of what that was like, here is Jack Granatstein:
"The boots proved unable to withstand wet English weather and almost literally melted. The Oliver equipment, its belts and packs hated by Canadians in South Africa, was carried overseas by all but five battalions. There it was dumped because it could not carry as much ammunition as the newer British web pattern, which was also much more comfortable. The Canadian-made trucks were mainly scrapped in England because spare parts could not readily be found overseas. The horse-drawn Bain wagons were found to be too flimsy to carry ammunition and less maneouverable that British models, so were soon jettisoned. Contracts for artillery ammunition, issued later in 1914, turned into an appalling scandal, with both profiteering and sloppy workmanship creating difficulties for Hughes and the government."
It wasn't just made-in-Canada materiel which was sub-par either:
"Hughes's intention had always been to transport the Canadian Division to Britain as quickly as possible and to complete its training there. In fact, virtually no training was accomplished at Valcartier, so chaotic was the situation and so short the time. Troops fired their rifles on the ranges... and field engineer units got some practice throwing pontoon bridges across the local river. The field artillery gunners and some infantry units did small-scale tactical exercises, most did some route marches, and there were formal parades. That, aside from rifle and parade-square drill, was about all that was accomplished in Canada. And, since many men in the contingent had enlisted without even militia training, precious time had been squandered."
During the inter-war years, when Germany was combining advancements in armoured vehicles and wireless communications to build its panzer divisions, Canadian officers jockeyed for billets in Britain's Imperial War College (London for the clout, India for the lifestyle). Meanwhile, their troops plinked on homemade rifle ranges and polished horse tack.
The RCAF may take heart in knowing that the F-35 debacle was presaged by the Mackenzie King government's 1938 attempt to sole-source a contract for Bren light machine guns. The contract became a scandal which delayed delivery of the weapons, triggered a royal commission, and terminated Ian Mackenzie's stint as MND. After much hue-and-cry, the government managed to buy the guns, which served reliably through the Second World War and beyond.
Lest you think we learned anything from the bloodiest half-century of human history, think again. In his memoir A Soldier First, General (Ret'd) Rick Hillier wrote about deploying as a young officer to Germany with faulty tank sights. The made-in-Canada digital sights were supposedly superior to simple ballistic reticles, but they malfunctioned in warm weather (heat caused the metal of the turret to expand, applying pressure on critical circuitry). Instead of tackling the problem, the Army blamed the troops, Hillier recalled: "Everyone who looked into the issue said, 'No, it's the gunners' fault,' or 'Put a few wet sandbags on the roof of that turret and we'll be good to go.'"
The curse of Canadian procurement throttles the CAF like the cold dead hands of Sam Hughes grasping at our throat from the grave.
During a stint in a Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group headquarters, I remember a day when the G4 shop2 erupted in a spontaneous cheering. That week just over 40% of the brigade's vehicle fleet had been deemed serviceable, which was considered a major accomplishment. We were at that time the Army's high-readiness brigade, the one earmarked for NATO contingencies.
Politicians (in and out of uniform) are bragging about our fifteen Leopard 2 tanks deploying to Latvia. What’s unsaid is that single squadron is practically the Army's serviceable fleet. We had to rob the Armoured School and two brigades of all their tanks to make it happen. At one point there was even a plan to rob one from the the school where vehicle, weapon, and electro-optical technicians are trained, but then we wouldn't have any new technicians who knew how to fix tanks so that scheme got scrubbed.
Not too long ago, the Armoured School was mounting their students on rental ATVs because there weren't any vehicle platforms available for training. Now their students roll in Mad Max jingle truck convoys using whatever’s available: four wheels, eight wheels, or tracks; turret or no turret; armoured or not; it doesn't matter they'll take it and run. Beggars can't be choosers.
Our howitzers are on palliative care and the artillery is feeling the global pinch on 155mm ammunition (we were short of even before the second invasion Ukraine). The Artillery School no longer trains students to operate howitzers, because their M777s (all two of them) were donated to Ukraine. Now their students get a basic driving course and some comms familiarization before being posted to their regiments for on-the-job training. Don’t ask about the state of ground-based air defence, we have none.
Soldiers and officers at the tactical level will readily tell you that these headlines are only surprising because senior leaders are finally saying the quiet part out loud: the CAF is undermanned, under-equipped, under-trained, and unprepared. We know this because we live it every day: situation normal, all fucked up. But you don’t need a source or a leak to learn about our deplorable state of readiness. Here is a link to DND’s 2023 audit and evaluation reports. They paint a bleak picture: we have insufficient equipment and what we have keeps breaking. We have insufficient personnel to match with commitments, and we are struggling to recruit, train, and retain more. Go have a look at the reports, they lay it all out.
I'll highlight the role that support trades, like vehicle and weapon technicians, play in these vicious cycles. Like the rest of the force, our support services are suffering from personnel shortages, especially amongst working-rank leadership who are responsible for most training, both on courses and on the job . When we pull these experienced techs out their shops to run courses, then they’re not doing their primary job of fixing broken stuff. As the backlog of non-serviceable equipment increases, units have to cast a wider net to find serviceable equipment for training and operations (including domestic operations like flood and wildfire response). This puts more wear-and-tear on fewer platforms, which then break and are added to the backlog and the feedback loop accelerates. The same thing happens with personnel: tasks go up, available pers go down, everyone works more and accomplishes less. When the MND referred to "death spirals" this is the sort of thing that he was talking about.
At least the Army can always train on land. Ripping around on an ATV shouting “clank clank I’m a tank” sucks, but consider that the RCN and RCAF can’t do much of anything without a working fleet of ships and aircraft. We've got half-trained pilots waiting eighteen months or more for a shot at getting qualified because flight instructors and aircraft simply aren’t available. These are some of the brightest young people in the country but we keep them rotting in make-work jobs at the squadrons. Meanwhile, the Navy's frail body is chained to the cannonball of the National Shipbuilding Strategy. Aspiring naval warfare officers are holding out hope that they might set foot on a new frigate before their contracts expire. Until then, they’ll make do with rusted tubs which are literal dumpster fires. Is it any surprise that we struggle to gain, train, and retain talent?
Why are we so fucked? Chronic underfunding and Ottawa’s unrelenting faith in soft power are commonly cited factors. That old chestnut about Canada being a fireproof house far from flammable material lingers on in the age of space and cyber warfare.
It's easy to blame all this on elected politicians, such is their due after all, but really we the CAF are most at fault. A culture of dishonesty and bullshit permeates the profession of arms in Canada. As the force of last resort, we must not fail. But in briefings and committees, the brass in Ottawa transfigure “must” into "we cannot fail." Apparently these alchemists didn’t learn to distinguish ought from is in staff college.
Let’s go back in time a bit and see what the CDS was telling the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence in 2018. Here’s a soundtrack to set the mood.
High fives and ass slaps all round (but mostly ass slaps). This next bit is interesting, because it starts off looking like Senator McPhedran is going to hold Gen Vance’s feet to the fire over the deplorable state of the RCN.
But actually, Senator McPhedran was hoping that the CAF would splash some cash on a remote Arctic town in her home province.
So that was then and Vance is no longer CDS. But as the years went by and everything generally got worse - the hoped-for influx of recruits didn’t happen, procurement projects were pushed to the right or shelved - but did we change our tune? Of course not!
This is a tweet issued by the Commander Canadian Army following the shipment of the first of four Canadian tanks destined for Ukraine. This kind of obscurantist bullshit doesn’t help anybody. The only truth in this tweet is that:
Canada shipped a tank to Europe, more specifically to Poland via the UK;
This was accomplished with RCAF assets.
Everything else that this tweet is trying to convey - the pride, the professionalism, the power projection - is a mirage. One tank is not “significant combat power” (not even when you multiply it by four). The shipment was part of a deliberate process which included weeks of staff work and repairs to the tanks themselves, there was nothing “quick” about it. All that aside, committing a quarter of the nation’s strategic airlift capability to deliver one tank to an airport in Poland doesn’t even come close to demonstrating an ability to “project significant combat power” during a war. This was not a problem which only the CAF could solve for fuck’s sake, it’s just shipping stuff between friendly countries. This is bog standard civilian logistics, FedEx does this every day and probably does it cheaper! If FedEx delivers a shotgun to my door then are they “projecting combat power” too? C’mon Sir, I know you know better.
Politicians respond to their constituents, their party, and their non-elected advisors. If their constituents and the party are indifferent to the military and the specialist advisors aren't ringing alarm bells, then what they worry? Six years ago, the CDS told the Senate we were green-to-green. Now it’s 2024, the CAF is short nearly 16 000 bodies, and I’ve got troops asking me why they’ve got no kit, no vehicles, and no ammo. So now I’m asking, why are operational commitments the only number going up?
DND’s budget has been reduced by $810 million for the next fiscal year and $908 million after that. While the field force is rationing every bean, bullet, and bandaid, you know what we piles of have money for?
Huh, I guess they do care about the troops. We just have to die first.
English translation: “The situation is serious, but our problems are not unique, and I know that the Air Force and the Army are facing similar problems.”
G4 is the team in a headquarters responsible for logistics.
The plight of the CAF is back in the headlines. For today. It's been in the headlines often enough over the years, but those brief spasms of attention almost never translate into substantive changes for the better. We can hope that this time will be different, but the smart money is betting that it'll fade into the news background yet again and little or nothing will change ... except the continued decline in equipment availability, trained personnel retention, and ability to deploy for domestic or overseas emergencies.
@Sam Cooper